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Sexual Orientation Differences in Attitudes about Sexuality, Race, and Gender
By Eric Anthony Grollman

ABSTRACT
Researchers have extensively documented sociodemographic predictors of race and gender
attitudes, and the mechanisms through which such attitudes are formed and change. Despite its
growing recognition as an important status characteristic, sexual orientation has received little
attention as a predictor of Americans’ race and gender attitudes. Using nationally representative
data from the American National Election Survey 2012 Time Series Study, I compare
heterosexuals’ and lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) people’s attitudes about sexuality, race, and
gender. For most attitudes, LGB people hold significantly more liberal attitudes about sexuality,
race, and gender than do heterosexuals, even upon controlling for other powerful
sociodemographic predictors of social attitudes. However, a substantial proportion of these
sexual orientation gaps in attitudes – especially about race and gender – are explained by LGB
people’s relatively liberal political ideology. The findings provide evidence for the necessity of
incorporating sexual orientation in future assessments of Americans’ social and political
attitudes.
(Word Count: 150)
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SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND ATTITUDES
Sexual Orientation Differences in Attitudes about Sexuality, Race, and Gender

“The dirty little secret about the homosexual population is that white gay people
are just as racist as white straight people.”
(Boykin 1996: 234)

“Gay culture, [gay activists say], is better because it is less sexist, less classist,
and less racist than heterosexual culture.”
(Savin-Williams 2005: 17)

1.

INTRODUCTION

Many scholars and activists have speculated about the race and gender attitudes of lesbian, gay,
and bisexual (LGB) people relative to the views of heterosexuals. Anecdotal accounts, such as
the quotes at the opening of this article, have presented two contradictory predictions about the
views of LGB people. Some have suggested that LGB people share the views of their
heterosexual counterparts, specifically in terms of race and gender attitudes (Smith 1999;
Taywaditep 2001). Others have argued that LGB culture, organizations, and movements are less
likely to harbor prejudice toward other oppressed groups due to their own marginalized status in
society (Savin-Williams 2005). However, little research has empirically examined the effect of
sexual orientation on Americans’ race and gender attitudes. Indeed, although sexual orientation
is recognized as an important status characteristic (Johnson 1995; Webster and Hysom 1998),
one that likely influences individuals’ attitudes and values (Mucciaroni 2011), it is rarely

4

SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND ATTITUDES

5

considered in attitudinal research. Scholars have long investigated attitudes toward LGB people,
while consistently overlooking the attitudes of LGB people.
The present study uses data from the American National Election Survey (ANES) 2012
Time Series Study, a nationally representative sample of Americans ages 18 and older, to
investigate sexual orientation differences in attitudes regarding sexuality, race, and gender.
Specifically, this paper investigates two research questions. First, given LGB people’s
marginalized status in society, do they hold more liberal attitudes toward Black Americans and
women, as well as themselves, than their heterosexual counterparts? Second, to what extent are
potential sexual orientation gaps in these attitudes explained by sexual orientation differences in
education, religion, and/or political ideology?
2.

SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND ATTITUDES: COMPETING EXPECTATIONS

In addition to documenting trends in sexuality, race, and gender attitudes over time, social
scientists have extensively investigated sociodemographic differences in, as well as other social
determinants of, such attitudes (e.g., Brooks and Bolzendahl 2004, Loftus 2001). Prior research
suggests that socioeconomic status (especially education), age, religion, region of the country,
and urbanicity are consistent predictors of social attitudes (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004; Carter
and Carter 2014; Cunningham et al. 2005; Hunt 2007). Studies on racial differences in gender
and sexuality attitudes, and gender differences in race attitudes have yielded mixed findings
(Hughes and Tuch 2003; Kane 2000; Kane and Whipkey 2009; Loftus 2001). While such
research is extensive, scholars have rarely considered the effect of sexual orientation on
Americans’ social attitudes. In addition, though many of these sociodemographic characteristics
also predict attitudes toward lesbian women and gay men (Andersen and Fetner 2008; Loftus
2001; Powell et al. 2010), research on sexuality attitudes almost exclusively focuses on LGB
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people as the targets of such attitudes held among heterosexuals. LGB people’s own sexuality
attitudes, as well as their race and gender attitudes have been understudied.
Generally, most studies on LGB people’s social attitudes lack a comparable heterosexual
sample (e.g., Harr and Kane 2008; Hirsch and Rollins 2007; Rollins and Hirsch 2003) and/or are
limited to attitudes toward themselves or specific LGB subgroups (e.g., Cragun and Sumerau
2015; Doan, Loehr, and Miller 2014; Stone 2009). Relying on small, non-representative samples,
some early studies on sexual orientation differences in race and gender attitudes yield mixed
findings. While some studies have found no differences between sexual minorities and
heterosexuals in social attitudes in general (Bailey 1999; Bell and Weinberg 1978; Saghir and
Robins 1973), others suggest LGB people may be more tolerant toward Black Americans,
women, and other stigmatized groups (Beran et al. 1992; Corbett, Troiden, and Dodder 1977;
Lalonde, Doan, and Patterson 2000; McDonald and Moore 1978). More recently, political
scientists have used election data and large surveys to examine differences in LGB and
heterosexuals’ political attitudes and behaviors (Egan 2012; Hertzog 1996; Lewis, Rogers, and
Sherrill 2011). This research suggests that LGB people are politically distinct from their
heterosexual counterparts, finding, in particular, that they are overwhelmingly liberal (Egan
2012; Hertzog 1996; Schaffner and Senic 2006). Such research has not yet extended beyond a
limited range of political attitudes. No study to date has used nationally representative data to
examine sexual orientation differences in social attitudes – in the present case, attitudes toward
Black Americans and women.
The present study offers an exploratory analysis of sexual orientation differences in
attitudes about sexuality, race, and gender using nationally representative data. I draw from two
sources to propose possible patterns for the association between sexual orientation and
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individuals’ views on sexuality, race, and gender: first, from prior research on sociodemographic
(especially racial and gender) differences in social attitudes; and, second, from prior scholarship
on the unique social, political, and demographic profile of LGB Americans. Based on this prior
research, there exist three possibilities for the effect of sexual orientation and attitudes: (1) no
sexual orientation differences in sexuality, race, and gender attitudes, (2) LGB people’s
significantly more liberal sexuality, but not race or gender, attitudes, and, (3) LGB people’s
significantly more liberal attitudes toward Black Americans and women, as well as themselves.
2.1

No Significant Sexual Orientation Differences in Attitudes
The first possible association between sexual orientation and attitudes regarding

sexuality, race, and gender is that there is little to no difference between heterosexuals’ and
sexual minorities’ views. One’s sexual orientation may simply have no influence on one’s
attitudes toward LGB people, Black Americans, and women, particularly upon controlling for
the effects of other powerful sociodemographic predictors of such attitudes. Prior research on
attitudes, particularly on gender attitudes, has identified primary socialization through one’s
family as a key mechanism through which one develops particular attitudes (Liao and Cai 1995;
Maio et al. 2003). Unlike racial socialization within families of color (Brown and Lesane-Brown
2006), for example, there is little evidence that socialization processes that center on nonheterosexuality exist (Epstein 1992; Stacey and Biblarz 2001). Rather, LGB and heterosexual
people alike are overwhelmingly reared in predominantly heterosexual families (Gonsiorek
1995; Sherrill 1996). Parenting practices tend to be heteronormative – that is, these practices
treat heterosexuality as normal, natural, and taken-for-granted, while homosexuality and
bisexuality are seen as deviant or are otherwise invisible (Kane 2006; Martin 2009). Other agents
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of socialization, including schools and the media, further contribute to the heteronormative
socialization of children (Martin and Kazyak 2009; Myers and Raymond 2010).
Further, secondary socialization into distinct lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and
queer (LGBTQ) communities tends to occur later in life, if at all, and is less formative than
primary (heteronormative) socialization (Epstein 1992). Unlike the other predictors of sexuality,
race, and gender attitudes that are established in early life, namely race and ethnicity, gender,
religion, and political ideology, one’s sexual orientation develops in early adolescence or
adulthood – especially for non-heterosexuals (Sherrill 1996). Sexual minority youth tend to have
few connections with other sexual minorities; rather, their friendships are largely with
heterosexual youth of their same race and grade level in school (Ueno 2005 and 2010). Only one
in four LGB people have ever lived in predominantly LGBTQ neighborhoods (Pew Research
Center 2013), and such communities have become less segregated and distinctive from the rest
of the predominantly heterosexual society (Ghaziani 2014). Thus, these sexual orientation-based
socialization processes come up against norms, values, and a sense of self that have already been
established. Further, scholars have suggested that LGBTQ communities, organizations, and
social movements are, at times, divided by race and ethnicity, gender, and class (Armstrong
2002; Battle et al. 2002; Barrett and Pollack 2005; Taywaditep 2001; Ward 2008). Thus, while
important, a significant effect of sexual orientation on sexuality, race, and gender attitudes at the
baseline may be explained by other sociodemographic characteristics, namely socioeconomic
status, age, and religion (Bailey 1999; Herek et al. 2010; Pew Research Center 2013).
Hypothesis 1: There are no significant sexual orientation differences in sexuality,
race, and gender attitudes, particularly upon controlling for other
sociodemographic characteristics.
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Significant Sexual Orientation Differences in Sexuality Attitudes Only
In the second possibility for the association between sexual orientation and attitudes, the

stigmatized status of LGB people may lead them to hold sexuality, but not race or gender,
attitudes that are distinct from those of heterosexuals. Though declining, there remains a high
level of antipathy toward sexual minorities in the US (Andersen and Fetner 2008; Loftus 2001;
Powell et al. 2010). A sizeable minority of Americans, including particular segments of the
population, strongly opposes LGBTQ rights (e.g., same-sex marriage, civil liberties) (Adamczyk
and Pit 2009; Kenneavy 2012; Sherkat et al. 2011). LGB people face pervasive interpersonal
discrimination and violence (Herek 2009; Tilcsik 2011), which is further compounded by
institutional discrimination (Levitt et al. 2008). For many, experiences of victimization begin in
childhood and adolescence (Freidman et al. 2008; Hatzenbuehler 2011). As a consequence of the
prejudice, discrimination, and violence they face, LGB people may have a unique view of the
social world, or “double consciousness” (DuBois 1903; Lewis et al. 2011; Orne 2013). Drawing
upon the underdog thesis, LGB people may be keenly aware and critical of bi- and homophobic
oppression, and may hold more favorable attitudes toward social policies that eliminate it (Davis
and Robinson 1991; Robinson 1983; Robinson and Bell 1978).
Yet, the liberalizing effect of one’s “underdog” status as a sexual minority may be limited
to attitudes about LGB people, relationships, and rights; LGB Americans may be
indistinguishable from heterosexuals in terms of attitudes toward Black Americans and women.
In fact, in its original conceptualization, the underdog thesis was considered a manifestation of
self-interest (Robinson and Bell 1978). That is, the liberal attitudes of marginalized individuals
may be driven by their interest in promoting their own equal status, while the more conservative
attitudes of members of privileged groups may be driven by their interest in maintaining the
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status quo (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004; Davis 2005; Kane and Whipkey 2009). Indeed, early
work using non-representative samples suggests that sexual minorities’ attitudes may be
indistinguishable from those of heterosexuals (Bailey 1999; Bell and Weinberg 1978; Connell
1992; Saghir and Robins 1973). These findings are similar to those on Black Americans’ and
women’s greater awareness of social inequality, yet greater intolerance toward other stigmatized
groups (e.g., atheists, the homeless) (Edgell, Gerteis, and Hartmann 2006; Lee, Farrell, Link
2004). As such, the effect of sexual orientation may be limited to the domain of sexuality
attitudes, perhaps driven by LGB people’s own self-interest (Schaffner and Senic 2006).
Hypothesis 2: LGB Americans hold significantly more liberal sexuality attitudes
than their heterosexual counterparts; however, there are no sexual orientation
differences in race and gender attitudes.
2.3

Significant Sexual Orientation Differences in Sexuality, Race, and Gender Attitudes
In the third possible effect of sexual orientation on sexuality, race, and gender attitudes,

the “underdog” status of LGB people may lead them to hold more liberal attitudes toward
themselves, as well as Black Americans and women. That is, they may be more likely than
heterosexuals to acknowledge pervasive racist and sexist discrimination, favor policies to redress
such discrimination, and feel warmth and empathy toward Black people and women. Some early
work suggests that sexual minorities report more favorable attitudes toward and greater
awareness of discrimination against racial and ethnic minorities and women, among other
stigmatized groups (Beran et al. 1992; Corbett et al. 1977; Lalonde et al. 2000; McDonald and
Moore 1978). Other scholars have found that LGB identified people are more pro-feminist and
more likely to support legal access to abortion services than are heterosexual identified people
(Hertzog 1996; Rothblum 2011; Schaffner and Senic 2006). There exists a distinct LGBTQ
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culture, containing a set of shared values, including the explicit celebration of diversity within
LGBTQ communities, and coalitions with other marginalized communities (Armstrong 2002;
Bernstein 2002; D’Emilio 2004; Lewis et al. 2011; Ward 2008). Thus, the results may suggest
that LGB people, indeed, hold more liberal race and gender attitudes, as well as those about
sexuality, than do heterosexuals.
Hypothesis 3: LGB Americans hold significantly more liberal sexuality, race, and gender
attitudes than heterosexuals, net of other sociodemographic predictors of such attitudes.
2.4

Possible Explanations for Sexual Orientation Gaps in Attitudes
The present study also explores possible mechanisms that produce sexual orientation

differences in sexuality, race, and gender attitudes, specifically education, religion, and political
ideology. Prior research has documented a number of factors that shape Americans’ attitudes,
particularly with regard to race and gender: group position and group threat, self-interest,
contact, exposure, and socialization (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004; Davis and Greenstein 2009;
Hughes and Tuch 2003; Kane and Whipkey 2009). However, since these predictors of attitudes
overwhelmingly reflect the lives of heterosexual people, they are less useful for understanding
the attitudes of sexual minorities. For example, it is unclear whether marriage and one’s spouse’s
work status affects LGB individuals’ gender attitudes in the same ways and to the same extent as
they do heterosexuals’ attitudes (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004; Davis and Greenstein 2009).
Indeed, this oversight reflects a broader trend in attitudinal research on the predictors of and
mechanisms that drive privileged group members’ attitudes (Hunt 2004; Samson 2012).
Sexual orientation differences in attitudes could stem, in part, from differences in the
demographic profiles of heterosexual and LGB Americans. In particular, LGB people tend to be
more highly educated, less religious, and more politically liberal than general (heterosexual)
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population (Gates 2015; Pew Research Center 2013). Historically, religion has played a central
role in the opposition to LGBTQ rights and in bi- and homophobic prejudice (Fetner 2008;
Loftus 2001; Sherkat et al. 2011). LGB people are generally less religious, and more likely than
heterosexuals to switch to a more liberal religion or to reject religion all together in adulthood
(Herek et al. 2010; Lewis et al. 2004; Pew Research Center 2013; Smith and Haider-Markel
2002). Political scientists have found that LGB people overwhelmingly self-identify as liberal,
with the majority of LGB voters supporting Democratic candidates (Bailey 1999; Herzog 1996;
Lewis et al. 2011; Smith and Haider-Markel 2002). In addition, LGB people tend to hold more
liberal positions than heterosexuals on war, environmental issues, and domestic spending, and
are more likely to reject traditional values regarding marriage and family (Bailey 1999; Egan
2012; Hertzog 1996; Meier, Hull, and Ortyl 2009).
Education, religion, and political orientation reflect three documented mechanisms of
sexuality, race, and gender attitudes, namely explaining racial and gender differences in such
attitudes (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004; Hunt 2007; Loftus 2001). For example, Black Americans
tend to be more conservative than their white counterparts on issues that are guided by religiosity
(e.g., abortion; Davis 2005). LGB people’s greater education, relatively low religiosity, and
greater liberalism may explain, in part, their more liberal sexuality, race, and gender attitudes.
Hypothesis 4: Significant sexual orientation differences in sexuality, race, and
gender attitudes are explained, in large part, by sexual orientation differences in
education, religion, and political ideology.
Using data from the ANES 2012 Time Series Study, I examine whether lesbian, gay, and
bisexual people hold more liberal sexuality, race, and gender attitudes than heterosexuals. Using
this nationally representative data, I investigate whether differences found between heterosexual
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and LGB people’s attitudes hold net of the effects of other sociodemographic predictors of
attitudes: gender, race and ethnicity, household income, age, marital/partner status, and region of
the country. In addition, I assess the extent to which three documented mechanisms that drive
social attitudes – education, religion, and political ideology – explain potential sexual orientation
gaps in sexuality, race, and gender attitudes.
4.

METHODS

4.1

Data

The present study uses data from the American National Election Survey (ANES) 2012 Time
Series Study (see ANES 2014 for a full description of the survey’s methodology and questions).
The ANES is a national, full probability pre- and post-election survey of non-institutionalized
US citizens ages 18 years or older, conducted by the University of Michigan Center of Political
Studies. The survey has been conducted during years of presidential elections since 1948,
assessing Americans’ voting behaviors, as well as their political and social attitudes. The ANES
is an ideal source of data for the present paper given its large, nationally representative sample,
wide variety of measures of sexuality, race, and gender attitudes, and inclusion of information
about respondents’ sexual orientation.
In 2012, the ANES was administered to 5,916 respondents through two modes: face-toface interviews with 2,054 US eligible voters (38 percent response rate), and an Internet survey
with 3,860 US eligible voters (2 percent response rate). Respondents who completed face-to-face
interviews were selected through address-based, stratified, multistage cluster sampling, with
oversamples of Black and Hispanic Americans. These interviews were supplemented with a
panel of respondents drawn from GfK, which was recruited through address-based sampling and
random-digit dialing; prospective panelists were offered free Internet service and hardware if
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they did not already have Internet access. Appendix A displays the descriptive statistics for the
ANES sample, including bivariate differences between respondents who completed the face-toface interviews and those who completed the Internet survey. Sample weights (described below)
account for all but one difference between the subsamples (i.e., religious attendance). All
multivariate analyses in the present paper include a control for survey version to account for
these remaining differences between the subsamples.
The ANES was administered in two parts, including the pre-election section (beginning
two months prior to the 2012 presidential election) and the post-election section (conducted from
November 7, 2012 through January 2013).1 Analyses for the present study are restricted to
respondents who completed both the pre- and post-election surveys. Listwise deletion for
missing information on independent and dependent variables is employed, yielding a final
sample of 4,526 respondents.2 Analyses are based on weighted data, which account for
probability of household selection, selection within the household, nonresponse, and random
sampling error; sample weights also adjust for differences between the ANES sample and the US
population on key sociodemographic characteristics (i.e., race, ethnicity, gender, education,
income, homeownership, age, marital status, region, urbanicity, and nativity).

1

The Internet version of the survey was administered as two smaller pre-election surveys and

two smaller post-election surveys, thus totaling four short surveys.
2

Data for these variables are systematically missing in a few ways. However, analyses using

multiple imputations for missing data on independent variables yield generally similar results to
those presented using listwise deletion (available upon request).
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Measures
Sexuality, Race, and Gender Attitudes. The ANES includes a number of items regarding

respondents’ attitudes toward women and sexual and racial minorities. Sexuality attitudes
include four items: warmth toward lesbians and gay men, recognition of homophobic
discrimination, support for legal recognition of same-sex couples, and support for legally
allowing same-sex couples to adopt children. I assess eleven items regarding attitudes toward
Black Americans, including support for Affirmative Action, recognition of racist discrimination
and inequality, warmth and feelings toward Black Americans, and racial resentment. Finally,
gender attitudes include twelve items, which assess views on traditional gender roles, recognition
of sexist discrimination, and support for legal access to abortion services. All sexuality, racial,
and gender attitudinal items are coded with higher values representing liberal or favorable
responses and lower values representing conservative or unfavorable responses. Appendix B
provides the means, standard deviations, and metrics for these attitudinal outcomes.3

3

Alternative ways of measuring variables were considered for three gender attitudinal outcomes

(analyses available upon request). Analyses assessing a four-point version of the belief that
working mothers can establish warm and secure relationships with their children (0=a great deal
harder; 4=neither easier nor harder/easier), which combines the responses “neither easier nor
harder,” “slightly easier,” “somewhat easier,” and “a great deal easier” into a single category,
yield similar results to those using the original seven-point version (0=a great deal harder; 6=a
great deal easier). Analyses that use a version of the item regarding opposition to restrictions on
abortion (0-2) that combine “legal abortion for reasons other than rape, incest, or danger” and
“legal abortion as a matter of personal choice” into a single category yield similar results to those
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Sexual Orientation. ANES respondents were asked the following question to collect
information regarding sexual orientation: “Do you consider yourself to be heterosexual or
straight, homosexual or gay/lesbian, or bisexual?” I measure sexual orientation using a
dichotomous variable, wherein lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) identified respondents are
coded as 1 and heterosexual identified respondents are coded as 0.4 I collapse lesbian/gay and
bisexual respondents into a single group because of their shared status and experiences as sexual
minorities and their small subsample sizes within the ANES.5

using the original variable (0-3). Finally, analyses that include an additional item in the abortion
scale (=.875) – support for legalized abortion if the reason is because the child is the “wrong”
sex – are similar to those presented excluding this item from the scale (=.881); maximum
likelihood factor analyses yield a single factor, on which the excluded item weakly loads.
4

Three percent of respondents (n=128) are missing exclusively on sexual orientation, including

40 respondents who responded, “don’t know.”
5

Supplemental analyses using dichotomous variables for bisexuals (yes=1) and lesbians and

gays (yes=1), compared to heterosexuals, reveal a number of interesting patterns (available upon
request). On six items, lesbian women and gay men, but not bisexuals, are significantly more
liberal than heterosexuals, including feeling sympathy for Black people (Models 1-2), admiring
Black people (all three models), believing that a working mother can form a warm bond with her
children (Models 1-2), and favoring legal abortion (Models 1-2). Lesbian and gay respondents
are significantly more liberal than both bisexuals and heterosexuals on four attitudinal items
regarding beliefs about gender: it is worse for a family if the man works and the woman is a
homemaker (all three models); men have more opportunities to advance than do women (all

SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND ATTITUDES

17

Sociodemographic Controls. To examine the effect of sexual orientation on sexuality,
race, and gender attitudes, I control for other variables that research has shown to influence these
and other social attitudes. I include dichotomous variables to measure race and ethnicity,
compared to non-Hispanic whites (1=yes for each): non-Hispanic Black, Latina/o, and other
nonwhites. Gender is measured using a dichotomous variable (woman=1, man=0). I measure
income using the natural logarithm of respondents’ annual household income (M=10.60
[approximately $42,500]). Age is measured in years, ranging from 18 to 90 and older (M=47.5).6
I measure marital or partner status using a binary indicator for respondent’s current relationship

three models); women demand equal treatment, not special rights (Models 1-2); and, women do
not cause more problems by complaining about sexist discrimination (Models 1-2). On one
items, a significant rank-order emerges, wherein lesbians and gays are the most liberal, followed
by bisexuals, followed by heterosexuals: warmth toward gays and lesbians (all three models).
However, given the small subsample sizes of lesbian women and gay men (n=110) and bisexual
people (n=93), these patterns should be interpreted with caution.
6

The original ANES measure of household income is a categorical variable, ranging from under

$5,000 (0) to $250,000 or more (27). The present paper uses a transformed version of this
variable, for which the natural logarithm of the midpoint of each range represents the original
category (7.824-12.492). For example, I recoded 24 ($125,000-$149,999) to the natural
logarithm of $137,500 (or 11.831). However, supplemental analyses using the original
categorical measure of household income are similar to those presented (available upon request).
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status (currently married or partnered=1). Region of the country is measured using a dichotomous
variable for respondents living in the US South (yes=1) compared to the rest of the country.7
Potential Mechanisms. To explore which social factors drive the potential relationships
between sexual orientation and attitudes, I control for three possible mediating variables that
have been shown to influence social attitudes. Education is a measure of the highest degree
respondents have earned, ranging from less than high school (0) to a graduate degree (4)
(M=1.92 [some college=2]). I measure religious attendance using an ordinal variable of the
frequency with which respondents attend religious services, apart from weddings, baptisms, and
funerals, ranging from never (0) to more than once per week (5) (M=1.62).8 Finally, political
ideology is a measure of the extent to which respondents identify as politically liberal, ranging
from 0 (extremely conservative) to 6 (extremely liberal) (M=2.76 [moderate=3]).9
4.3

7

Analysis Plan

Supplemental analyses using dichotomous variables for all four regions, including West, North

Central, and South, compared to Northeast, yield similar results (available upon request).
8

Supplemental analyses using biblical literalism (0=actual word of God; 2=not the word of God)

yield results that are generally similar to those to those presented (available upon request).
9

Supplemental analyses using political party affiliation (0=strong Republican; 6=strong

Democrat) yield similar results, with four exceptions. The effects of sexual orientation remain
significant – wherein LGB respondents hold more liberal views – in Models 3 for the following
items: the belief that whites have too much control in US politics, sympathy for Black people,
symbolic racism, and the belief that media should pay more attention to sexist discrimination.
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The analyses presented here include the following steps, after providing descriptive
statistics for the ANES sample. First, I estimate the effect of sexual orientation on each sexuality,
race, and gender attitudinal item, net of survey version. Second, I estimate the effects of sexual
orientation on each item, controlling for race and ethnicity, gender, household income, age,
marital/partner status, and region of the country. In particular, this step examines whether
significant effects of sexual orientation on sexuality, race, and gender attitudes are accounted for
by other important sociodemographic characteristics. The third set of multivariate models
estimate the effects of sexual orientation with additional controls for education, religious
attendance, and political ideology. In addition, I use post-hoc Sobel tests (Sobel 1982) to assess
whether education, religious attendance, and/or political ideology mediate the effects of sexual
orientation on outcomes for which there are significant sexual orientation gaps. This final step
will assess the extent to which these potential mechanisms explain significant differences in
LGB and heterosexual respondents’ sexuality, race, and gender attitudes. Appropriate regression
modeling is used for the multivariate analyses: ordinary least squares (OLS) regression for
additives scales that were created; binary logistic regression for binary outcomes; and, ordered
logistic regression for ordinal outcomes.
5.

RESULTS

5.1

Descriptive Statistics

Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the entire ANES sample, as well as the heterosexual
and LGB subsamples. Similar to other national estimates, 4 percent of ANES respondents
identify as lesbian, gay, or bisexual (Gates 2011 and 2015; Gates and Newport 2012b). Bivariate
regression analyses reveal a few sociodemographic differences between LGB and heterosexual
ANES respondents. Consistent with past research, LGB respondents in this sample are younger,
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live in households with less income, attend religious services less frequently, and are more
politically liberal than heterosexuals (Gates 2015; Herek et al. 2010; Pew Research Center 2013;
Gates and Newport 2012a). LGB people are also less likely to be currently married or partnered
than are heterosexual people.
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]
Table 1 also provides descriptive statistics for two sexual minority subgroups, bisexual
respondents and lesbian and gay respondents, which mirror prior estimates (Gates 2014; Pew
Research Center 2013). Women are less likely to identify as lesbian/gay than bisexual or
heterosexual (also see Gates 2015). The aforementioned significant household income difference
between heterosexual and LGB people is unique to bisexual respondents. In addition, lesbians
and gays report significantly more education, on average, than do heterosexuals and bisexuals
(also see Pew Research Center 2013 and Gates and Newport 2012a). Finally, lesbians and gays,
bisexuals, and heterosexuals are rank-ordered on age, wherein bisexuals are the youngest,
followed by lesbians and gay men, and then heterosexuals. Similarly, there is a rank-order on
political ideology, wherein lesbians and gays are the most liberal, followed by bisexuals, and
then heterosexuals. These sexual orientation differences will be accounted for in multivariate
regression analyses of sexuality, race, and gender attitudes that control for these
sociodemographic characteristics.
5.2

Sexuality Attitudes

In the first set of multivariate analyses, I focus on the association between sexual orientation and
sexuality attitudes to assess whether LGB respondents differ from heterosexuals, at least in the
domain of attitudes toward themselves. Table 2 presents the regression estimates for the first two
sexuality attitudinal outcomes, including regression estimates for the feeling thermometer for gay
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men and lesbian women and ordered logistic odds ratios for the perceived amount of
discrimination toward lesbian women and gay men in the US. Table 3 presents the ordered
logistic odds ratios for support for legal recognition of same-sex relationships and favoring legal
adoption of children for same-sex couples. For each attitudinal outcome, Model 1 displays the
results for the effect of sexual orientation, controlling for survey version. Models 2 add
sociodemographic controls, including respondents’ gender, race and ethnicity, household
income, age, marital/partner status, and region of the country. Finally, in Models 3, I add
controls for education, religious attendance, and political ideology.
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
In Models 1 (Table 2), the effects of sexual orientation are positive and statistically
significant for both warmth toward lesbians and gays and perceived amount of homophobic
discrimination. LGB respondents report significantly more warmth toward (=30.93; p<.001)
and perceive greater discrimination against (OR [odds ratios]: 3.16; CI [confidence intervals]:
2.30-4.32) lesbian women and gay men than do heterosexuals. Net of sociodemographic controls
in Models 2, the effects of sexual orientation are again significant on these two altitudinal items.
In the final model – Model 3 – LGB respondents are once again report being significantly more
warm toward (=30.93; p<.001) and perceive more discrimination against (OR: 2.13; CI: 1.532.93) lesbians and gays than heterosexuals, net of gender, race and ethnicity, household income,
age, marital/partner status, region, education, religious attendance, and political ideology.
The estimates for sexual orientation differences in favoring legal recognition of same-sex
couples and favoring allowing same-sex couples to adopt children (Table 3) mirror those of the
first two attitudes toward sexuality. Across all three models, LGB respondents are significantly
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more likely than heterosexuals to favor recognition of same-sex couples (OR: 3.98; CI: 2.29-6.93
[Model 3]) and allowing such couples to adopt children (OR: 6.89; CI: 3.43-13.87).
Taken together, there are significant sexual orientation gaps in all four of the
aforementioned sexuality attitudes, even net of sociodemographic controls, including education,
religious attendance, and political ideology. Compared to heterosexuals, LGB respondents hold
significantly more liberal attitudes toward themselves. Thus, at least with regard to views on
LGB people, relationships, and rights, sexual orientation has a significant effect on respondents’
attitudes. The following analyses will assess whether the significant effect of sexual orientation
on attitudes extends beyond LGB respondents’ self-interest.
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]
5.3

Race Attitudes
Next, I examine whether LGB and heterosexual ANES respondents differ significantly in

their race attitudes. Table 4 displays the regression estimates for the effects of sexual orientation
on eleven race attitudinal items, which reflect the following domains: support for Affirmative
Action programs and policies, perceptions of racist discrimination and inequality, and feelings
toward Black Americans. Models 1 regress each racial attitudinal outcome on sexual orientation,
controlling for survey version. Models 2 add controls for gender, race and ethnicity, gender,
household income, age, marital/partner status, and region of the country. Finally, Models 3 add
additional controls for education, religious attendance, and political ideology.
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE]
In Models 1, the effect of sexual orientation is positive and significant for one of the two
items regarding support for Affirmative Action. LGB respondents are significantly more likely to
favor Affirmative Action for Black Americans in higher education (OR: 1.62; CI: 1.11-2.35)
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compared to heterosexuals. The effect of sexual orientation on this attitudinal outcome is also
significant in Model 2 (OR: 1.50; CI: 1.00-2.25). That is, LGB people hold more liberal views on
this outcome than heterosexuals, net of other sociodemographic controls. Upon controlling for
education, religious attendance, and political ideology in Model 3, there is no longer a significant
difference in LGB and heterosexual respondents’ views on this outcome. However, across all
three models, there is no significant difference between LGB people and heterosexual people on
favoring Affirmative Action for Black people in hiring (OR: .87; CI: .56-1.34 [Model 3]).
The effects of sexual orientation on perceptions of racist discrimination and inequality are
positive and significant for all three items in this domain in Models 1 and 2. Net of
sociodemographic controls (Models 2), LGB respondents perceive significantly greater racist
discrimination (OR: 2.29; CI: 1.54-3.38), and too much influence of white Americans (OR: 2.75;
CI: 1.76-4.29) and too little influence of Black Americans (OR: 2.00; CI: 1.29-3.12) in US
politics. In Models 3, which control for education, religious attendance, and political ideology,
the effect of sexual orientation remains significant for only one of these items – perceived
amount of discrimination against Black people (OR: 1.57; CI: 1.05-2.35) – wherein LGB people
perceive a significantly greater amount of racist discrimination than do heterosexual people
There are significant sexual orientation gaps for half of the six items regarding
respondents’ feelings toward Black people: sympathy and admiration for Black Americans, and
racial resentment. LGB people report significantly greater sympathy for Black people (OR: 1.77;
CI: 1.23-2.55) and less racial resentment (=1.78; p<.001) than do heterosexuals, net of
sociodemographic controls; however, the effects of sexual orientation on these feelings are
nonsignificant in Models 3, which control for the three potential mechanisms. Across all three
models, the effect of sexual orientation is positive and significant for admiration for Black
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Americans. Net of sociodemographic controls, as well as education, religious attendance, and
political ideology, LGB respondents report feeling significantly more admiration toward Black
people (OR: 1.50; CI: 1.04-2.17). The effects of sexual orientation on the remaining three items
– view of Black Americans as hardworking and as intelligent, and warmth toward Black
Americans – are nonsignificant in all three models.
Taken together, LGB respondents hold more liberal race attitudes than heterosexuals, net
of other important sociodemographic characteristics (Models 2) for nearly two-thirds of the
outcomes (7 of 11, or 64 percent). In particular, compared to heterosexuals, LGB people are
significantly more likely to favor Affirmative Action in higher education for Black Americans,
perceive a great deal of racist discrimination and inequality (in politics), feel sympathy and
admiration for Black people, and hold relatively low racial resentment. However, upon
controlling for the potential mechanisms – education, religious attendance, and political ideology
– the effects of sexual orientation remain significant on only two of the race attitudes (2 out of
11, or 18 percent): perceived amount of discrimination against and admiration for Black people.
5.4

Gender Attitudes
In the third set of analyses, I examine whether LGB and heterosexual ANES respondents

differ significantly in their gender attitudes, which include the domains of traditional gender
roles, recognition of sexist discrimination, and support for legalized abortion. Table 5 provides
the regression estimates for the effects of sexual orientation on the twelve gender attitudinal
items. Models 1 regress each gender attitudinal item on sexual orientation, controlling for survey
version. Models 2 add controls for respondents’ race and ethnicity, gender, education, income,
age, region, and religious attendance. Finally, in Models 3, I add controls for political ideology.
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE]
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Across all three models, the effects of sexual orientation are positive and significant for
two of the three items regarding gender roles. LGB respondents are significantly more likely
than heterosexuals to see having a woman president in the next 20 years as beneficial for the US
(OR: 1.61; CI: 1.07-2.40 [Model 3]) and that it is worse for families to have women work in the
home while their husbands work outside of it (OR: 1.59; CI: 1.14-2.21 [Model 3]). In addition, in
Model 1, LGB people are significantly more likely than heterosexuals to agree that it is easier for
a working mother to establish warm and secure relationships with her children than mothers who
do not work outside of the home (OR: 1.46; CI: 1.01-2.11); however, the effect of sexual
orientation on this outcome is nonsignificant in Models 2 and 3.
The effects of sexual orientation are positive and significant on four of the seven items
regarding recognition of sexist discrimination in Models 1, and in Models 2 net of
sociodemographic controls. LGB respondents perceive significantly more sexist discrimination
in the US (OR: 2.86; CI: 1.92-4.26 [Model 2]), and are significantly more likely to report that
sexism is a serious problem in the US (OR: 2.00; CI: 1.26-3.15 [Model 2]), than do
heterosexuals. Additionally, LGB respondents are significantly more likely than heterosexuals to
report that men have more opportunities than women (OR: 1.81; CI: 1.24-2.63) and that that the
media should pay more attention to sexist discrimination (OR: 2.15; CI: 1.45-3.17 [Model 2]).
However, LGB people do not differ significantly from heterosexuals in the extent to which they
perceive that employers discriminate against women in the workplace. In addition, the effects for
sexual orientation on two items that reflect modern sexism – that is, the belief that women are
demanding special favors rather than equal treatment, and that they cause more problems by
complaining about discrimination – are nonsignificant. Taken together, LGB people report
significantly more liberal views, net of other important sociodemographic characteristics, on
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over half of the items regarding sexist discrimination. The effect of sexual orientation is
significant net of education, religious attendance, and political ideology (Models 3) for only one
item: perceived amount of discrimination (OR: 2.14; CI: 1.44-3.16).
Finally, the effects of sexual orientation are positive and significant on both abortion
attitudes in Models 1 and 2. Even net of sociodemographic characteristics, LGB respondents are
significantly more likely to favor legal access to abortion services than are heterosexual
respondents. However, upon controlling for education, religious attendance, and political
ideology in Models 3, the effect of sexual orientation on abortion attitudes is nonsignificant.
In sum, there are significant sexual orientation gaps in gender attitudes, net of other
important sociodemographic predictors (Models 2), for two-thirds of the outcomes (8 out of 12,
or 67 percent). Compared to heterosexuals, LGB respondents hold more liberal attitudes
regarding gender roles, are more likely to recognize pervasive sexist discrimination as a problem,
and are more likely to oppose restrictions on access to abortion services. For these outcomes, the
effects of sexual orientation remain significant even upon accounting for the influence of other
powerful determinants of gender attitudes. However, the effects of sexual orientation remain
significant net of education, religious attendance, and political ideology (Models 3) for only onequarter of gender attitudinal outcomes (3 out of 12, or 25 percent): seeing a woman president as
beneficial to the US; believing that women as homemakers is worse for families; and, perceiving
a great amount of sexist discrimination in the US.
5.5

Explaining Sexual Orientation Gaps in Attitudes
In Models 2 of the aforementioned multivariate analyses, there were significant sexual

orientation gaps in all four sexuality attitudes, as well as for a majority of the attitudes regarding
race (7 out of 11) and gender (8 out of 12), net of gender, race and ethnicity, household income,

SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND ATTITUDES

27

age, marital/partner status, and region of the country. Upon controlling for education, religious
attendance, and political ideology in Models 3, it appears that almost all of these gaps were
reduced, at least slightly. Indeed, the difference between LGB and heterosexual respondents’
attitudes was nonsignificant for five race attitudes and five gender attitudes, net of these potential
mechanisms. It is possible that sexual orientation differences in education, religious attendance,
and/or political ideology (Models 3) explain LGB respondents’ relatively more liberal sexuality,
race, and gender attitudes.
In the final set of analyses, I use post-hoc Sobel tests for mediation, including
sociodemographic controls, to investigate the extent to which education, religious attendance,
and political ideology mediate the effects of sexual orientation on attitudes. These attitudes
include the four sexuality attitudes, seven race attitudes, and eight gender attitudes for which
there were significant sexual orientation gaps in Models 2 (Tables 2-5). Table 6 presents the
estimates for mediation analysis for the potential mechanisms; these estimates include the level
at which the mediation is statistically significant, the Sobel test statistic (Z), and the percentage
of the total effect of sexual orientation on each attitude that is explained by the mechanism.
Whereas preliminary results (available upon request) suggest that education does not
significantly mediate the effect of sexual orientation on any attitude, these estimates are not
included in Table 6.
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE]
The effects of sexual orientation on seven of these nineteen items (37 percent) are
significantly mediated by religious attendance. Sexual orientation differences in religious
attendance explain 3-5 percent of the significant sexual orientation differences for three sexuality
items: warmth toward lesbians and gays (Z=2.24; p<.05); favoring legal recognition of same-sex

SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND ATTITUDES

28

couples (Z=2.26; p<.05); and, favoring legalizing adoption for same-sex couples (Z=3.75;
p<.05). Interestingly, for two racial attitudinal items – sympathy (Z=-2.14; p<.05) and admiration
(Z=-2.16; p<.05) toward Black Americans – religious attendance widens the gap between LGB
and heterosexual respondents’ feelings. That is, religious attendance appears to suppress the
effects of sexual orientation on these two items. Finally, religious attendance explains roughly 6
percent of LGB respondents’ more liberal views regarding the benefits of a woman president
(Z=1.99; p<.05) and the harm of having women as homemakers for their families (Z=2.17;
p<.05). Taken together, the mediating role of religious attendance of the sexual orientationattitudes link is selective and generally small.
Interestingly, the effects of sexual orientation on attitudes are significantly mediated by
political ideology for all nineteen sexuality, race, and gender attitudes. Liberal political ideology
explains between 14.09 (favor legal adoption for same-sex couples; Z=8.422; p<.001) and 32.00
(perceive great amount of homophobic discrimination; Z=8.25; p<.001) percent of the significant
sexual orientation gap in sexuality attitudes. The mediating role of political ideology on the
sexual orientation-attitudes is markedly stronger for race and gender attitudes, explaining, on
average, roughly 55 percent of the total effects of sexual orientation on these attitudes. For race
attitudes, this explanatory power of political ideology ranges from 22.60 percent (i.e., admiration
for Black people [Z=5.79; p<.001]) to 94.70 percent (i.e., favoring Affirmative Action for Black
people in higher education [Z=8.82; p<.001]). Its explanatory ranges from 25.69 percent (i.e.,
perceived amount of sexist discrimination [Z=7.87; p<.001]) to 116.98 percent (i.e., legalized
abortion scale [Z=9.12; p<.001]). For the latter item – views regarding legal access to abortion
services – the effect of sexual orientation becomes nonsignificant and reverses in direction (i.e.,
negative) upon the inclusion of a control for political ideology. Thus, it appears that LGB
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respondents’ relatively more liberal political ideology explains a substantial amount of their
more liberal attitudes toward Black Americans and women. In many cases, it explains half of to
nearly the full total effect of sexual orientation on race and gender attitudes.
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DISCUSSION

In the present paper, I sought to extend preliminary research on the effect of sexual orientation
on sexuality, race, and gender attitudes using a nationally representative sample of lesbian, gay,
bisexual (LGB) and heterosexual Americans. In particular, I examined whether LGB people,
given their marginalized status, hold more liberal attitudes toward women and Black Americans,
as well as themselves, than do their heterosexual counterparts. I also assessed the extent to which
sexual orientation gaps in attitudes are explained by sexual orientation differences in three
mechanisms that shape attitudes: education, religion, and political ideology. Building upon prior
attitudinal research, I identified four possibilities for the relationship between sexual orientation
and attitudes: 1) no sexual orientation differences, especially upon accounting for the influence
of other sociodemographic characteristics; 2) LGB people’s more liberal attitudes toward
themselves, perhaps due to self-interest; 3) LGB people’s more liberal sexuality, race, and
gender attitudes, perhaps due to their “underdog” status in society; and, finally, 4) LGB people’s
more liberal sexuality, race, and gender attitudes, partially driven by their relatively high level of
education and political liberalism, yet low religiosity.
The results offer two key findings. First, there is clear evidence that sexual orientation
has a strong effect on Americans’ sexuality, race, and gender attitudes, wherein LGB people tend
to hold more liberal views regarding lesbian and gay rights, racial and gender equality.
Compared to their heterosexual peers, LGB people are more likely to favor legal same-sex
marriage, adoption by same-sex couples, and feel warmer toward and recognize greater
discrimination against lesbian women and gay men. Similar patterns were found for the majority
of attitudes regarding race (7 out of 11 items [64 percent]) and gender (8 out of 12 items [67
percent]), net of the influence of other powerful sociodemographic predictors of these attitudes.
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These results suggest that there are substantial sexual orientation gaps in a number of domains,
wherein LGB people are more liberal in their views than are heterosexuals: recognition of racist
and sexist discrimination; recognition of racial and gender inequality; racial resentment;
sympathy and admiration toward Blacks; rejection of traditional gender roles; and, favoring
unrestricted and legal access to abortion services. Initially, these findings offer support for
Hypothesis 3, wherein LGB people hold more liberal sexuality, race, and gender attitudes even
once accounting for the effects of other sociodemographic characteristics.
Second, the majority of the aforementioned nineteen significant sexual orientation gaps in
sexuality, race, and gender attitudes were explained, at least partially, by LGB’s relatively more
liberal political ideology. Upon controlling for education, religious attendance, and political
ideology, the effects of sexual orientation became nonsignificant for ten of these nineteen
attitudinal outcomes (e.g., racial inequality in politics, racial resentment, abortion, level of sexist
discrimination); the effects of sexual orientation on many of the other nine attitudinal items are
reduced (e.g., all four sexuality attitudes, racist discrimination, rejection of traditional gender
roles). Sexual orientation differences in political ideology explained nearly one-fourth, on
average, of LGB people’s more liberal sexuality attitudes. Notably, LGB people’s greater
political liberalism explained, on average, over half of the significant sexual orientation
differences in race and gender attitudes. These patterns offer partial support for Hypothesis 4,
wherein sexual orientation gaps in sexuality, race, and gender attitudes are partially driven by
sexual orientation differences in political ideology, and slightly by religious attendance (but not
education). These findings complement prior work on LGB Americans’ distinctive politically
liberal profile, highlighting that their liberal views also extend to racial and gender issues (Beran
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et al. 1992; Corbett et al. 1977; Hertzog 1996; Lalonde et al. 2000; McDonald and Moore 1978;
Schaffner and Senic 2006).
On the whole, the results offer greatest support for the prediction that sexual orientation
gaps exist in sexuality, race, and gender attitudes that are driven, in large part, by political
ideology. However, to varying degrees, the present paper’s findings can be interpreted to lend
support for the role of socialization, and self-interest and empathy (both via the underdog thesis).
The role of heteronormative socialization in shaping heterosexuals’ and sexual minorities’
attitudes alike cannot be overlooked. For example, a small minority (6-7 percent) of LGB people
reported unfavorable or conservative attitudes toward themselves: cold feelings toward gays and
lesbians; perception of little or no homophobic discrimination; and opposition to same-sex
marriage and adoption. LGB adults are perhaps not entirely immune from the prejudiced values
and attitudes of their families, peers, and the influence of other social institutions. Yet, the
overwhelming rejection of homophobic attitudes by LGB respondents may reflect an active
rejection of their parents’ values, particularly those that clash with their own identities and
experiences (Ojeda and Hatemi 2015).
There is greater evidence, however, of an alternative view of the role of socialization in
producing sexual orientation differences in attitudes. The results of the present study parallel
Egan’s (2012) finding that nearly half of the difference in political attitudes and behaviors
between LGB and heterosexual people is attributable to differences in upbringing, wherein LGB
people are more likely to be raised in liberal homes and communities (Felson 2011; also see
Butler 2005 and McCabe, Brewster, and Tillman 2011). In particular, certain characteristics of
respondents’ upbringing explained LGB people’s relatively more liberal political ideology:
college-educated mothers, younger age, urban hometown, raised in a region of the country with
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greater acceptance of homosexuality, and being raised by both parents who were born in the US.
In other words, similar to one variant of exposure as a mechanism through which gender
attitudes are shaped (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004; Davis and Greenstein 2009), LGB people are
more likely to be exposed to liberal values during childhood and adolescence. Indeed, Egan
(2012) argues that LGB Americans are politically cohesive as a group even before or in the
absence of group mobilization and contact with fellow LGBTQ people in general; their
distinctiveness has already emerged by the start of adulthood.
The present paper cannot adequately investigate the potentially complex interplay
between sexual identity and sociopolitical attitudes during childhood socialization given its
reliance on cross-sectional data. For example, socialization within a liberal household may
influence children to be more open regarding diverse sexual identities (including exploring their
own) (Stacey and Biblarz 2001); yet, prior research suggests that the effect of socialization on
attitudes (especially on gender roles) gives way to the influences of experiences and relationships
in adulthood (Davis and Greenstein 2009). Socialization alone, then, may not explain sexual
orientation differences in attitudes. Future research should investigate other potential
mechanisms (e.g., discrimination, marriage, the extent to which one is “out” or public about their
LGB identity) that may strengthen or weaken the effects of sexual orientation on social and
political attitudes, with particular attention their influence over the life course.
The results also suggest that the underdog thesis (Davis and Robison 1991; Robinson
1983; Robinson and Bell 1978) may be applicable for explaining LGB people’s relatively liberal
sexuality, race, and gender attitudes. LGB Americans, as an “underdog” group – a population
subjected to widespread discrimination and violence – are more aware of sexual, racial, and
gender inequality, especially discrimination, and are more likely to favor programs and policies
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that redress such inequality. It is noteworthy that LGB people’s underdog status influences their
views about their own equal treatment, but also the equal treatment of Black Americans and
women. Yet, compared to attitudes toward themselves, LGB people’s liberal race and gender
attitudes were explained to a much greater extent by their more liberal political ideology. This
slight distinction may be driven, in part, by the greater strength of LGB people’s motivation to
advance their own rights and status in society (i.e., self-interest) than that of their liberal political
ideology and, presumably, their liberal upbringing (Lewis et al. 2011; Schaffner and Senic
2006).
A few limitations of this study should be noted. First, the analyses rely on cross-sectional
data, which prohibit the investigation of the relationships among sexual orientation and attitudes
over time. Additionally, the ANES does not include measures that reflect respondents’
upbringing nor experiences of discrimination and violence. Future research using longitudinal
design should further examine the relationships and temporal ordering among upbringing, sexual
identity, experiences of stigma and discrimination (as “underdogs”), and social attitudes.
Second, the ANES data include a small subsample size of lesbian, gay, and bisexual
individuals (n=203). As such, the results may present a conservative estimate of the extent and
strength of sexual orientation gaps in sexuality, race, and gender attitudes. The small subsample
size prevented meaningful comparisons between bisexual respondents and lesbian and gay
respondents. Supplemental analyses comparing the three groups – bisexuals, lesbians and gays,
and heterosexuals – suggested that the two former groups differ significantly on eleven outcomes
(see Footnote #5). In particular, lesbians and gays are perhaps more liberal in their sexuality,
race, and gender than are bisexuals. Indeed, there may be important demographic, ideological,
and experiential differences among bisexuals, lesbians, and gays (e.g., socioeconomic status, age
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at coming out, LGBTQ community involvement, experiences of discrimination, voting
behaviors; Pew Research Center 2013). However, given the extremely small subsample sizes of
sexual orientation groups, these results should be interpreted with caution. In addition, the small
number of LGB identified ANES respondents also prohibited an investigation of intersections
among sexual orientation and other important identities like race, gender, and social class.
Perhaps similar to research on (the absence of) gender differences in whites’ race attitudes
(Hughes and Tuch 2003), researchers may also find that whites’ race attitudes do not vary by
sexual orientation due to a shared racial group position. Obtaining large and representative
samples of LGB people, as a hard-to-reach population, remains a challenge for survey research
(Binson et al. 2010; Meyer and Wilson 2009).
A final limitation is the use of self-reported sexual identity as a measure of sexual
orientation. This measure is limited in a few ways. First, nearly three percent of ANES
respondents did not disclose their sexual orientation. Certain populations – for example, those
with lower levels of education – are more likely to refuse such information (Jans et al. 2015).
Given the stigma that surrounds same-sex sexuality, an unknowable number of sexual minorities
may have refused to identify as LGB during the ANES interview or online survey; however,
greater social acceptance of LGBTQ people has coincided with less non-response on questions
pertaining to sexual identity and increased LGB identification (Jans et al. 2015). Second, the
ANES sexual orientation item was limited to heterosexual, lesbian, gay, and bisexual identities,
thus overlooking other identities (e.g., queer, pansexual). Some research suggests that less visible
and uncommon identities may be associated with more radical views (Harr and Kane 2008;
Rollins and Hirsh 2003, 2007). Finally, other dimensions of sexuality – namely attraction and
behavior (Sell 2010) – were not considered in the analyses. Though overlapping, same-sex
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attraction, same-sex sexual behavior, and LGB identity do not perfectly correlate in the
population; the majority of adults who report any same-sex sexual partners identify as
heterosexuals (Gates 2011; Herbenick et al. 2010). It is unclear, for example, whether the
attitudes of heterosexual identified people who are attracted to or have had relationships with
people of their own gender would mirror those of other heterosexuals, those of LGB identified
people, or be distinct from both. Future research on attitudes should offer a more inclusive set of
sexual identities and include measures of multiple dimensions of sexuality.
The aforementioned limitations considered, the present paper offers the first estimates of
the effects of sexual orientation on sexuality, race, and gender attitudes within a nationally
representative sample of American adults. It contributes to research on the predictors of
Americans’ sexuality, race, and gender attitudes, in particular, lending strong support for adding
sexual orientation to the list of sociodemographic predictors of attitudes. This study also
contributes to the growing body of research on the social, political, and demographic profile of
LGBTQ Americans. Along with other studies, it highlights the social and political distinctiveness
of this marginalized population. Future research should continue to examine the role that
sexuality plays in one’s sexual and non-sexual lives, including one’s attitudes and worldviews.
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TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics for Sociodemographic Characteristics by Sexual Orientation (N=4,526)
SAMPLE
(N=4,526)
Lesbian, gay, or bisexual (1=yes)
.04
Female (1=yes)
.51
Black (1=yes)
.11
Latina/o (1=yes)
.11
Other nonwhite (1=yes)
.06
Household income (logged; 10.60=$42,500)
10.61
Age, in years (18-90+)
47.40
Married/Partnered (1=yes)
.63
US South (1=yes)
.37
Education (0=less than high school; 4=graduate degree)
1.94
Religious attendance (0=never; 5=more than once per week)
1.59
Political ideology (0=extremely conservative; 6=extremely liberal)
2.77
Source: 2012 American National Election Survey.
Notes: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 compared to heterosexuals.
Sample sizes based on unweighted data.
A
Lesbian and gay respondents significantly differ from bisexual respondents (p<.05).

Heterosexuals
Respondents
(n=4,323)
-.51
.11
.11
.06
10.62
47.68
.64
.38
1.94
1.62
2.71

Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Respondents
All LGB
Bisexual
Lesbian/Gay
(n=203)
(n=93)
(n=110)
---.43
.57
.31***A
.12
.14
.10
.14
.10
.17
.07
.09
.05
10.37*
10.28**
10.45
40.96***
40.06***
41.72*A
.44***
.40***
.46***
.32
.38
.28
1.99
1.69
2.24***A
.84***
1.04**
.67***
***
***
4.04
3.50
4.50***A
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TABLE 2. OLS Regression Estimates and Odds Ratios for the Effects of Sexual
Orientation on Sexuality Attitudes (N=4,526)
Warmth toward Gays and Lesbiansa
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
30.93***
30.15***
22.16***
(2.32)
(2.36)
(2.15)

Amount of Homophobic Discrimination b
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
3.16***
3.17***
2.13***
(2.30-4.32)
(2.31-4.36)
(1.54-2.93)

Female

9.23***
(1.08)

9.32***
(1.01)

1.40***
(1.22-1.61)

1.35***
(1.17-1.56)

Black

3.55*
(1.79)

2.91
(1.82)

2.04***
(1.58-2.63)

1.72***
(1.32-2.26)

Latina/o

3.77
(1.96)

4.54*
(1.80)

1.19
(.92-1.53)

1.06
(.81-1.37)

Other
Nonwhite

-5.07*
(2.56)

-6.11*
(2.45)

.93
(.67-1.29)

.89
(.64-1.23)

Income

2.44***
(.53)

1.46**
(.54)

1.00
(.94-1.07)

1.03
(.96-1.11)

Age

-.18***
(.03)

-.09**
(.03)

1.00
(1.00-1.00)

1.00
(1.00-1.01)

Married/
Partnered

-2.43*
(1.21)

-.87
(1.13)

.85*
(.72-.99)

.90
(.76-1.05)

US South

-5.17***
(1.16)

-3.37**
(1.08)

.95
(.82-1.10)

1.02
(.87-1.18)

Lesbian, Gay,
or Bisexual

Education

3.14***
(.46)

.92*
(.86-.98)

Religious
Attendance

-2.82***
(.32)

.97
(.93-1.01)

Liberal

4.81***
(.36)

1.41***
(1.34-1.49)

Source: 2012 American National Election Survey.
Notes: All models control for survey version. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
a
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression estimates, with standard errors in parentheses.
b
Ordered logistic odds ratios, with 95 percent confidence intervals in parentheses.
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TABLE 3. Odds Ratios for the Effects of Sexual Orientation on Attitudes Regarding SameSex Couples and Adoption (N=4,526)
Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Couplesa
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
7.17***
6.70***
3.98***
(4.44-11.58) (4.13-1.87)
(2.29-6.93)

Allow Same-Sex Couples to Adoptb
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
10.41***
10.52***
6.89***
(4.89-22.16) (4.88-22.66) (3.43-13.87)

Female

1.30***
(1.12-1.51)

1.39***
(1.19-1.64)

1.51***
(1.28-1.79)

1.71***
(1.42-2.07)

Black

.75*
(.59-.95)

.65**
(.50-.85)

.94
(.72-1.23)

.91
(.67-1.24)

Latina/o

.97
(.75-1.26)

.95
(.72-1.26)

.65**
(.49-.85)

.62**
(.46-.85)

Other
Nonwhite

.67*
(.49-.93)

.56**
(.38-.81)

.67*
(.47-.95)

.52**
(.35-.79)

1.11**
(1.03-1.19)

1.06
(.98-1.16)

1.11**
(1.03-1.20)

1.07
(.98-1.17)

Age

.98***
(.98-.99)

.99***
(.99-1.00)

.98***
(.98-.99)

.99**
(.98-1.00)

Married/
Partnered

.77**
(.66-.91)

.87
(.73-1.04)

.89
(.74-1.07)

1.03
(.84-1.26)

US South

.67***
(.58-.79)

.74***
(.63-.88)

.70***
(.59-.84)

.78*
(.65-.95)

Lesbian, Gay,
or Bisexual

Income

Education

1.30***
(1.20-1.41)

1.29***
(1.17-1.41)

Religious
Attendance

.69***
(.66-.73)

.69***
(.65-.73)

1.71***
(1.60-1.81)

1.60***
(1.48-1.72)

Liberal

Source: 2012 American National Election Survey.
Notes: All models control for survey version. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
a
Ordered logistic odds ratios, with 95 percent confidence intervals in parentheses.
b
Binary logistic odds ratios, with 95 percent confidence intervals in parentheses.
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TABLE 4. Ordered Logistic Odds Ratios and OLS Regression Estimates for the Effects of
Sexual Orientation on Race Attitudes (N=4,526)
OR
Affirmative Action
Affirmative Action for
Blacks in higher education
Affirmative Action for
Blacks in hiring
Discrimination and Inequality
Great deal of discrimination
against Blacks in US today

Model 1
(95% CI)

Model 2
OR
(95% CI)

Model 3
OR
(95% CI)

1.62*

(1.11-2.35)

1.50*

(1.00-2.25)

1.02

(.66-1.58)

1.43

(.98-2.07)

1.31

(.89-1.93)

.87

(.56-1.34)

2.26*** (1.55-3.29)

2.29*** (1.54-3.38)

1.57*

(1.05-2.35)

Whites have too much
influence in US politics

2.66*** (1.81-3.92)

2.75*** (1.76-4.29)

1.54

(.99-2.40)

Blacks have too little
influence in US politics

2.11*** (1.45-3.06)

2.00** (1.29-3.12)

1.27

(.79-2.03)

1.68**

(1.20-2.37)

1.77** (1.23-2.55)

1.44

(1.00-2.07)

Admiration toward Blacks

1.49*

(1.08-2.07)

1.60*

(1.12-2.30)

1.50*

(1.04-2.17)

Blacks are hardworking

1.29

(.98-1.71)

1.30

(.96-1.77)

1.09

(.79-1.50)

Blacks are intelligent

.98

(.73-1.31)

1.00

(.73-1.37)

.94

(.68-1.29)

Warmth toward Blacksa

.64

(2.18)

1.70

(2.33)

.55

(2.33)

Feelings toward Black People
Sympathy toward Blacks

Racial resentment scalea
1.93***
(.39)
1.78***
(.39)
.65
(.39)
*
Source: 2012 American National Election Survey. Notes: p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests). Higher
odds and estimates represent more liberal attitudes for each racial attitude outcome.
Models 1 control for sexual orientation and survey version.
Models 2 add controls for race and ethnicity, gender, income, age, marital/partner status, and region.
Models 3 add controls for education, religious attendance, and political ideology.
a
OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
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TABLE 5. Ordered Logistic Odds Ratios and OLS Regression Estimates for the Effects of
Sexual Orientation on Gender Attitudes (N=4,526)
Model 1
OR
(95% CI)
Gender Roles
Good for the US to have a
woman president in next 20
years

Model 2
OR
(95% CI)

Model 3
OR
(95% CI)

2.48***

(1.713.60)

2.51*** (1.68-3.77)

1.61*

(1.072.40)

Working mothers can
establish warm and secure
relationships with children

1.46*

(1.012.11)

1.45

1.23

(.84-1.81)

Worse for family if man
works and woman is a
homemaker

2.60***

(1.873.60)

2.27*** (1.63-3.16)

1.59**

(1.142.21)

2.66***

(1.803.93)

2.86*** (1.92-4.26)

2.14***

(1.443.16)

Sexist discrimination in the
US is a serious problem

2.01**

(1.303.11)

2.00**

(1.26-3.15)

1.38

(.88-2.15)

Employers often discriminate
against women in the
workplace

1.37

1.36

(.89-2.08)

1.14

(.74-1.76)

Men have many more
opportunities for achievement
than women

1.63**

(1.142.35)

1.81**

(1.24-2.63)

1.26

(.89-1.79)

Media should pay more
attention to sexist
discrimination

2.03***

(1.422.90)

2.15*** (1.45-3.17)

1.42

(.96-2.09)

Women demand equality, not
special favors.

1.36

(.88-2.11)

1.45

(.95-2.20)

.93

(.61-1.43)

Women do not cause
problems by complaining
about discrimination

1.44

(.89-2.33)

1.44

(.88-2.34)

1.03

(.63-1.66)

Sexist Discrimination
Great deal of sexist
discrimination in US today

Abortion
No restrictions on abortion
Legalized abortion scalea

(.91-2.06)

(1.00-2.12)

2.21***

(1.563.14)

2.24*** (1.56-3.22)

1.19

(.81-1.76)

6.29***

(1.51)

6.29***

-.59

(1.16)

(1.48)

Source: 2012 American National Election Survey. Notes: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests). Higher
odds and estimates represent more liberal attitudes for each gender attitude outcome.
Models 1 control for sexual orientation and survey version.
Models 2 add controls for race and ethnicity, gender, income, age, marital/partner status, and region.
Models 3 add controls for education, religious attendance, and political ideology.
a
OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
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TABLE 6. Summary of Mediation Analyses for Religious Attendance and Political
Ideology on the Sexual Orientation-Attitudes Relationships
Religious Attendance

Political Ideology
%
Sig.
Z
explained

Sig.

Z

% explained

*

2.239

3.457

***

8.660

19.189

ns

-

-

***

8.245

32.001

Favor legal recognition of same-sex couples

*

2.261

4.693

***

8.888

23.344

Belief that same-sex couples should be
legally permitted to adopt children

*

2.257

3.745

***

8.422

14.093

-

-

***

8.823

94.695

-

-

***

8.193

43.563

Sexuality Attitudes
Warmth toward gays and lesbians
Amount of homophobic discrimination

Race Attitudes
Affirmative Action for Blacks in higher
education

ns

Great deal of racist discrimination in US
today

ns

Whites have too much influence in politics

ns

-

-

***

8.491

54.767

Blacks have too little influence in politics

ns

-

-

***

8.402

63.843

Sympathy toward Blacks

*

-2.143

-1.430

***

7.511

41.262

Admiration toward Blacks

*

-2.156

-10.990

***

5.788

22.596

ns

-

-

***

9.044

60.999

*

1.985

5.723

***

8.403

42.155

*

2.166

5.988

***

7.124

35.393

Great deal of sexist discrimination today

ns

-

-

***

7.867

25.691

Sexist discrimination in the US is a serious
problem

ns

-

-

***

8.296

50.424

Men have many more opportunities for
achievement than women

ns

-

-

***

7.540

54.759

Media should pay more attention to sexist
discrimination

ns

-

-

***

8.467

49.920

No restrictions on abortion

ns

-

-

***

8.637

68.069

Legalized abortion scalea

ns

-

-

***

9.122

116.980

Racial resentment scalea
Gender Attitudes
Good for the US to have a woman president
in next 20 years
Worse for family if man works and woman
is a homemaker
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Source: 2012 American National Election Survey. Notes: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Controls include survey
version, race, ethnicity, gender, income, age, marital/partner status, region, and education. Percentages represent
how much of the effect of sexual orientation on the attitudinal outcome is explained.

SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND ATTITUDES
APPENDIX A. Descriptive Statistics for Sociodemographic Characteristics by Survey
Version (N=4,823)
SAMPLE
(N=4,526)
.04
.51
.11
.11
.06
10.61
47.40
.63
.37
1.94
1.59
2.77

Face-to-Face
Version
(n=1,174)
.03
.52
.10
.10
.06
10.71
46.52
.65
.37
2.01
1.69
2.81

Internet
Version
(n=3,352)
.04
.50
.12
.11
.06
10.58**
47.73*
.62
.38
1.91
1.55*
2.75

Lesbian, gay, or bisexual (1=yes)
Female (1=yes)
Black (1=yes)
Latina/o (1=yes)
Other nonwhite (1=yes)
Household income (logged; 10.60=$42,500)
Age, in years (18-90+)
Married/Partnered (1=yes)
US South (1=yes)
Education (0=less than high school; 4=graduate degree)
Religious attendance (0=never; 5=more than once per week)
Political ideology (0=extremely conservative; 6=extremely
liberal)
Source: 2012 American National Election Survey.
Notes: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 compared to respondents who completed the face-to-face version of the
survey. Sample sizes based on unweighted data.
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APPENDIX B. Means, Standard Deviations, Metrics, and Descriptions of American
National Election Survey (ANES) Attitudinal Items about Sexuality, Race, and Gender
Variable
Sexuality Attitudes
Warmth toward gay men and lesbian women

Metric
0 = very cold or unfavorable
feeling, 50 = no feeling at all, 100
= very warm or favorable feeling

M
(SD)
51.95
(27.82)

Perceived amount of homophobic discrimination in the
US today

0 = none at all, 2 = moderate
amount, 4 = a great deal

View on legal recognition of same-sex relationships

0 = no recognition, 1 = civil unions
only, 2 = marriage

1.16
(.80)

Believe that gay or lesbian couples should be legally
permitted to adopt children

0 = no, 1 = yes

.64
(.48)

Race Attitudes
Favor allowing universities to increase number of Black
students by considering race in choosing students

2.56
(1.07)

0 = oppose a great deal, 3 =
neither, 6 = favor a great deal

1.95
(1.86)

Favor allowing companies to increase number of Black
workers by considering race when choosing employees

0 = oppose a great deal, 3 =
neither, 6 = favor a great deal

1.81
(1.83)

Perceived amount of racist discrimination in the US
today

0 = none at all, 2 = moderate
amount, 4 = a great deal

2.09
(1.02)

Whites have too much little influence in American
politics

0 = too little, 1 = just about the
right amount, 2 = too much

1.18
(.59)

Blacks have too little influence in American politics

0 = too much, 1 = just about the
right amount, 2 = too little

1.16
(.66)

Warmth toward Blacks

0 = very cold or unfavorable
feeling, 50 = no feeling at all, 100
= very warm or favorable feeling

How often feel sympathy for Blacks

0 = never, 2 = about half of the
time, 4 = always

1.27
(1.05)

How often feel admiration for Blacks

0 = never, 2 = about half of the
time, 4 = always

1.49
(1.07)

How hardworking Blacks are

0 = extremely lazy, 3 = neither
lazy nor hardworking, 6 =
extremely hardworking

3.04
(1.42)

How intelligent Blacks are

0 = extremely unintelligent, 3 =
3.42
neither unintelligent nor
(1.33)
intelligent, 6 = extremely
intelligent
(Continued on next page.)

64.72
(22.10)

SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND ATTITUDES

Variable
Racial resentment scale (=.80): belief that (1) Blacks
are not worse off than whites because they do not work
hard enough, (2) Blacks have gotten less than they
deserve, (3) Blacks should not have to work their way
up without special favors to overcome prejudice, and (4)
generations of slavery and discrimination made it
difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower
class
Gender Attitudes
How good it be for the US to have a woman president in
next 20 years
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(Appendix B continued from previous page.)
M
Metric
(SD)
0 = strongly disagree with all four
5.85
statements, 8 = midpoint, 16 =
(6.16)
strongly agree with all four
statements

0 = extremely bad, 3 = neither, 6 =
extremely good

3.80
(1.49)

How much easier is it for working mothers to establish
warm and secure relationships with their children

0 = a great deal harder, 3 = neither,
6 = a great deal easier

1.74
(1.28)

It is worse for the family if the man works outside of the
home and the woman takes care of the home and family

0 = much better, 3 = makes no
difference, 6 = much worse

1.99
(1.44)

Perceived amount of sexist discrimination in the US
today

0 = none at all, 2 = moderate
amount, 4 = a great deal

1.76
(.96)

How serious a problem is sexist discrimination in the US

0 = not a problem at all, 4 =
extremely serious problem

1.68
(.94)

How often do employers discriminate against women in
making decisions about hiring and promotion

0 = never, 2 = about half of the
time, 4 = always

1.36
(.79)

Men have more opportunities to achieve than women

0 = women have many more, 3 =
equal, 6 = men have many more

4.13
(1.37)

The news media should pay more attention to sexist
discrimination

0 = a great deal less, 3 = same
amount, 6 = a great deal more

3.44
(1.57)

Perceived frequency that women demand equality, not
special favors these days

0 = always seek special favors, 4 =
never seek special favors

2.78
(.96)

Perceived frequency that women cause more problems
than they solve when complaining about discrimination

0 = always cause more problems, 4
= never cause more problems

2.54
(.95)

View on legal restrictions against abortion

0 = abortion should never be
permitted, 3 = a woman should
always be able to obtain an
abortion as a matter of personal
choice

Legalized abortion scale (=.88): favor abortion if (1)
staying pregnant would hurt woman’s health, (2) staying
pregnant would cause woman to die, (3) pregnancy was
caused by incest, (4) pregnancy was caused by rape, (5)
fetus will be born with a serious birth defect, (6) having

0 = greatly oppose abortion in
seven circumstances, 28 =
midpoint, 56 = greatly favor
abortion in all seven circumstances

1.95
(1.08)

34.12
(15.84)
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the child would be extremely difficult financially, and
(7) woman chooses to have an abortion
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